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Abstract 
In the next years, France will renew a consistent share of hydroelectric concessions, among 
which we find those insisting on the Aspe and its tributaries (for a total of almost 100 MW). 
Beauty contests will take place, where bidders will present offers for technical and 
environmental improvements, as well as a revenue sharing percentage for Local Authorities. 
This framework generates a potential trade-off between revenue-sharing and environmental 
improvement. Our work investigates this trade-off by means of a discrete choice experiment 
(DCE) to estimate people’s preferences. The experiment has been conducted on a representative 
sample living in the Aspe valley. In our DCE, we translate the revenue sharing in an immediate 
rebate in the electricity bill. Respondents could choose higher rebates and lower ecosystem 
improvements or lower (or no) rebate and higher ecosystem amelioration. 
According to the experiment results, the highest total willingness to pay (WTP) is above € 144 
per household and per year. Moreover, people’s marginal WTP for a satisfactory fish stock 
reaches 250 €/year, that is three times the maximum rebate that was offered. Finally, all 
environmental attributes are considered as significant and worth a monetary effort. Therefore, 
hydroelectric concession bidders should give clear priority to environmental aspects.  
 
JEL Classification: H23, Q2, Q4, Q5 
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1 Introduction 
In the next years, France will have to renew a consistent share of hydroelectric concessions, 
among which we can find those insisting on the Aspe and its tributaries (for a total of almost 100 
MW of installed capacity). The Aspe is the torrential river flowing through the Aspe valley, one of 
the three main valleys of the High-Béarn, in the Southwest of France. The Aspe river is part of 
Natura 2000, an ecological network of protected areas within the European Union.  
In 2008, the EU forced the French Government to adopt a transparent and non-discriminatory 
procedure to renew hydro concessions. Accordingly, France modified the procedure pursuant to 
which concessions of hydroelectric plants with an installed capacity of more than 4.5 MW are 
awarded to private operators. Whereas, under the former procedure, the incumbent had a 
preference right when concessions expired, the new provision introduces publicity and 
competition requirements in the selection process.  Within the tender procedure the 
environmental aspects will weigh significantly as, in compliance with the Water Framework 
Directive (WFD, 2000/60/EC), France rivers are expected to attain a good ecological status by 
2015.  
The procedure introduced by the French Government is structured as a beauty contest, where 
petitioners have to fulfill different criteria determined by the French Ministry of energy and 
Environment (MEEDDM), and namely: 
1. Technical improvements: which means that candidates are expected to significantly 
ameliorate the existing infrastructures in order to increase (if possible) the production; 
2. Environmental impact: within each project, petitioners have to show their actions to 
reduce their environmental impact; 
3. Revenue sharing: candidates are expected to present a financial business plan in which 
they will show the expected revenues and a revenue sharing percentage (which will then 
be divided among the State and Local Authorities). 
Despite being an emission free technology, hydropower impacts the environment in several 
other ways. In particular, hydropower production harms biodiversity, fluvial ecosystems and 
their services (among others:  e re ghino et al., 2002; Croze et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2009; 
Renofalt et al., 2010). 
Impacts vary greatly according to the (non) adoption of mitigation measures and to production 
strategies. Mitigation measures vary from simple fish-passages to complex outflow reservoirs 
aimed at minimizing flow changes generated by hydro-peaking. Changes in production 
strategies normally mean reducing flow alterations by means of re-naturalisation (Nilsson, 
 3 
1996). This is in sharp contrast with the functioning of electricity markets, as intraday price 
volatility clearly implicates intraday production variability.  
For instance, the impact of different mitigation and management choices on fish migration has 
been tested by Chanseau et al. (1999) on one hydropower scheme on the Aspe river. The authors 
conducted two experiments, the first one in 1995 and the second one in 1998, to test the 
efficiency of two different downstream bypasses for salmon smolts. In 1995, the bypass 
efficiency was very low (with a success rate of 17%), mainly due to hydraulic conditions. A 
training wall was built in 1997 to reverse the flow pattern in the canal and to better guide the 
fish to the water intake of the new bypass. This simple change improved the bypass efficiency to 
55%. Moreover, the authors demonstrated that efficiency of both devices and the smolt behavior 
were directly affected by the turbine operation and the hydraulic conditions in the intake 
channel.  
As specified above, the renewal procedure introduced by the French Government is structured 
as a beauty contest, where petitioners (bidders) have to offer a revenue sharing percentage and 
to propose environmental improvements. We expect that the higher the offer for environmental 
improvements, the lower the offer for revenue sharing.   
The scope of this paper is straightforward: we study the emerging trade-off between a better 
environment and a higher percentage of money handed down to Local Authorities by estimating 
people’s preferences. Therefore, we have conceived a discrete choice experiment (DCE), 
whereby we translate the revenue sharing in an immediate rebate in the electricity bill. 
Respondents could opt for a higher rebate, with the consequence that the fluvial ecosystem 
remains at its current status (that is, operators cannot perform worse than the incumbent from 
an environmental point of view), or for a lower (or even no) rebate for (substantial) fluvial 
ecosystem improvements.  
In real life, there will be no rebate; still, an increased amount of money for local communities 
should mean either less local taxes or better local services.  This justifies also why we targeted 
only people leaving in the Region and not people from anywhere in France: a consistent part of 
the revenue sharing percentage will, in fact, accrue to local authorities. 
The paper shows that people are willing to pay to increase the ecological status of the Aspe 
river; the highest total willingness to pay (WTP) is above € 144 per household and per year. 
The paper unfolds as follows: in section 2 we review the literature on aquatic ecosystem 
evaluation; section 3 sets out the experimental design and the econometric approach; section 4 
is devoted to the results of the choice experiment; section 5 concludes. 
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2 Literature review on aquatic ecosystem evaluation 
There are several techniques to monetize environmental impacts. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to discuss the pros and cons of each methodology (for a critical assessment see Bateman 
et al., 2002). Given the multidimensional and complex nature of ecosystems, there is ample 
scientific consensus (Hoyos, 2010) that the method most capable of estimating how a 
combination of changes to one or more ecosystem services affects human welfare is the discrete 
choice experiment.   
DCE involves the design of a hypothetical market, in which people have to choose their preferred 
“product”, which is decomposed in some relevant attributes, each of which has more than one 
level.  For instance, the product car, can be decomposed in two attributes, one being Origin of the 
producer and the other one being Design. Each attribute can take several levels; for instance, the 
first attribute can have three levels (Italian, German, Other European), while Design might have 
just two (Coupé and Station Wagon). Respondents face several choice sets, each containing a 
certain number of mutually exclusive alternatives, relating the potential product to a change of 
in the level of its attributes. Clearly, each alternative has a price: consequently, respondents will 
choose according to their taste, but also according to the price of the product. Repeating the 
choice with different combinations of levels and prices should return the attribute level that is 
valued the most. 
When it comes to environmental goods, and in particular the fluvial ecosystem, it is important to 
relate the change of attribute levels to an action, normally a change in policy or a change in 
managing the resource or other choices that have an impact on it. A standard procedure when 
testing DCE for environmental goods is to include in every choice set an alternative that reflects 
either the current status (status quo) of the good being evaluated or an opt-out alternative, 
which means the worst possible situation.  Normally, the price (or cost) of these alternatives is 
equal to 0. The DCE format allows marginal utility estimates for changes in the level of each 
attribute to be easily converted to WTP estimates. Moreover, given that compensating variation 
measures may be obtained, it is possible to estimate the total value of improvements to the 
environmental good as a consequence of the policy or managerial change. 
Whenever evaluating the environmental impacts in water bodies, the crucial elements for the 
design of DCE are: the definition of the affected population; the delimitation of the water bodies 
under analysis, and the attributes chosen to describe the environment.   
As for population scale, it can vary from just the users or those residing near the water bodies 
under study (Hynes et al., 2008; Kataria et al., 2012; Stithou et al., 2012) to a representative 
sample of the regional or national population (Kataria, 2009; Metcalfe et al., 2012). The target 
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population clearly depends, on the one hand, on the expected effects of the policy or managerial 
changes under consideration, on the other, on the water bodies under consideration, which can 
vary from a single river (Hanley et al., 2006), to a river catchment (Brouwer et al., 2010; Poirier 
and Fleuret, 2010), to all the water bodies in a region or country (Kataria, 2009; Metcalfe et al., 
2012). 
Normally, attributes used in the DCE surveys relate the ecology of the water body to recreational 
opportunities and to the aesthetics of the water body. It is important to bear in mind that the 
attributes chosen for the choice experiment should differ from the attributes studied for 
determining the environmental impacts. Why so? In order to have a successful choice 
experiment, there is the need to test attributes that are relevant for the stakeholders involved, 
which normally means the general public. Consequently, the attributes or the levels used in the 
questionnaires have to be linked to the environmental attributes used to assess the impacts, but 
they need not to be the same. A simple example might help: an attribute such as water quality 
can be expressed in terms of its different levels of chemical components or in simpler terms such 
as swimmable or non-swimmable; it is straightforward that this familiar attribute to the general 
public depends on the level of some chemical substances. This means that attribute levels are 
commonly qualitative (Hanley et al., 2005; Alvarez-Farizo et al., 2007; Birol et al., 2008) and 
sometimes with images or visual descriptions (Doerthy et al., 2013). The most common 
attributes are: biodiversity levels, generally described as different quantities of native species 
(Morrison and Bennett, 2004; Kragt et al., 2011); recreational activities, that is the possibility to 
practice them or not (Doerthy et al., 2013); and aesthetics often described as a conglomerate of 
the effects of litter, smell and clarity (Alvarez-Farizo et al., 2007), sewage (Hanley et al., 2006) 
and pollution (Stithou et al., 2012). 
To our knowledge, only one paper has used DCE to estimate how individuals value different 
environmental improvements for rivers where hydropower production takes place, that is 
Kataria (2009). The paper focuses on Swedish rivers and is aim is to assess the market share of 
environmentally friendly producers, which are expected to face higher production costs. 
The peculiarity of the DCE we have conducted is the bidding vehicle that we have used. Instead 
of an electricity bill increase, the vehicle is a bill rebate, which is normally associated with a 
willingness to accept.  How is it possible to design a rebate as a willingness to pay? 
Within the renewal procedure, bidders are asked to offer a percentage of revenue sharing and an 
improvement of the fluvial ecosystem. First of all, this means that the opt-out alternative is the 
current status.  Secondly, this means that whoever wins will either pay to Central and Local 
Authorities the current revenue sharing percentage (which is 0%) or, more probably, a higher 
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one. Consequently, bidders will present offers which mix different levels of environmental 
improvement and revenue sharing percentages. Both strategies have minimum thresholds: from 
an ecosystem point of view, they cannot be below the current status; as for the percentage, it 
cannot clearly be below 0%.  
Since improving fluvial ecosystem is costly, we expect that higher levels of ecosystem recovery 
be associated with lower economic offers; conversely, higher economic offers will come at the 
price of lower levels of ecosystem recovery. Whenever a trade-off emerges, it is important to test 
people’s preferences. In order to do so, it is fundamental to find a good way of presenting the 
situation. In this case, we have imagined that this revenue sharing percentage can be translated 
into immediate rebates in the electricity bill. Actually, there will be no rebate; still, an increased 
amount of money for Local Authorities should mean either less local taxes or better local 
services.  In this case, though, rebates are not associated to ecosystem degradation: in fact, at the 
highest level of rebate is associated the status quo. As a consequence, the experiment has a 
willingness to pay approach: we are asking people whether they are ready to renounce to money 
they could spend on something else in order to have a better fluvial ecosystem.  
Whenever evaluating the environmental impacts in water bodies, the crucial elements for the 
design of DCE are: the definition of the affected population; the delimitation of the water bodies 
under analysis and the attributes chosen to describe the environment (see the previous chapter 
for details). Given that Local Authorities will benefit from the renewal procedure, we decided to 
target only people leaving in the Region and not people from anywhere in France. 
3 Experimental design 
3.1 The Aspe river 
The Aspe is the torrential river flowing through the Aspe valley, one of the three main valleys of 
the High-Béarn, in the Southwest of France. The Aspe river is part of Natura 2000, an ecological 
network of protected areas within the European Union. On the Aspe river there are 16 
hydropower plants, for a total of 93 MW, of which 63 MW are run-of-the-river plants.  
In 2007, a road accident in the Aspe Valley resulted in the discharge of 17,000 litres  of 
Potassium Hydroxide in the river, destroying the entire fauna for 4 kilometres and severely 
affecting the upper part of the river . This  lead to an immediate ban on fishing for 5 years and to 
the adoption of restoration measures. After seven years, the Aspe ecosystem has recovered, but 
the accident has increased environmental awareness in the local population. Moreover, it has 
shown how important is the natural flow: all hydropower operators were forced to release 
water in order to dilute the Potassium Hydroxide, letting the river act as a natural depurator.  
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Figure 1: Localization of the Aspe river and its ecological status 
Four years after the road accident, the French Ministry of Environment conducted an economic 
analysis of the events (Application des methods d’équivalence à la pollution accidentelle du Gave 
d’Aspe, 2011), based solely on restoration costs. In the final document, the Ministry 
acknowledged the need to compare the results with other methods and, in particular, with 
stated or revealed preferences. Unfortunately, these analyses were never carried out. At the end 
of our study, we will compare our findings with the figures in the abovementioned document. 
3.2 Structure, attributes and levels 
The questionnaire consisted of two parts. In the first part respondents were asked questions 
about their attitude towards the Aspe river and their socio-economic status. The second part, 
instead, contained the choice experiment. 
Attributes and levels relevant for the Aspe river ecosystem have been chosen with a Delphi 
survey, which involved 15 selected experts and which was coordinated by the local Water 
Agency (Agence de l’eau Adour-Garonne). The Delphi survey was crucial not only to define the 
Ecological status of water (2006-2007) 
Very good 
Good  
Average 
Poor  
Bad 
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attributes and their levels, but it also confirmed that different way of managing hydropower 
production were effective in increasing the quality of the riverine ecosystem. The results of the 
Delphi showed that there are three attributes that are more relevant for the Aspe ecosystem, 
namely water quality, fish population and hydro-morphology. Moreover, with the Delphi it was 
possible to define the present situation of the three attributes describing the fluvial ecosystem. 
For the sake of understanding, all attribute levels have been expressed in qualitative and 
figurative terms. Finally, experts provided me with images and visual descriptions of the 
attributes described.  
As stated above, the first attribute is water quality, representing the chemical and physical 
conditions of the waters. The attribute is represented qualitatively, according to the scale 
provided by the Water Agency. The present situation is sufficient, while the foreseen 
improvements are good and very good. 
The second attribute is fish population. Hydropower production normally has a consistent 
negative impact on the natural reproduction of fish population (Renofalt et al. 2010). The Aspe 
River is one of the last rivers in the Pyrenees where the Atlantic salmon and the sea trout 
migrate for reproduction (DRE, 2008).  The protection of these species is crucial and those fishes 
are essential elements of the Aspe ecosystem. The levels chosen were qualitative and based on 
the scale defined by DRE, 2008. The actual status is unsatisfactory.  
The third attribute is hydro-morphology, which indicates whether a river has a natural flow. The 
attribute was represented with images taken from the Aspe river. We used this attribute to see 
how much the respondents value a naturally flowing water body. In fact, if properly designed, 
built and managed hydropower plants might not alter significantly the natural flow of the river, 
which in turn increases the riverine ecosystem.  The actual status is artificial. In Table 1, we 
show that two attributes have two levels, while water quality has three.  
Attribute Description Level 
Water Quality Chemical conditions Sufficient; Good; Very 
Good. 
Fish Population Abundance and evolution of the stock Unsatisfactory; 
Satisfactory. 
Hydro-morphology Closeness to natural conditions Natural; Artificial. 
Rebate Reduction of electricity bill per 
household (in EUR) 
0; 10; 45; 75. 
Table 1: Attribute and attribute levels. 
The maximum rebate was determined taking into account how much could accrue to a single 
household. At present, the only Concession where the revenue-sharing mechanism has taken 
place is the one on the Rhone, held by CNR. The revenue sharing has been set at 25% (CNR, 
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2013), a percentage that we have used for our computation. The maximum rebate could not 
exceed 75 euro per household, corresponding to a considerable 15% of the average electricity 
bill (CRE, 2013), considering that:  
 the average electricity price on the Power Exchange for 2013 was around 50 €/MWh 
(CRE, 2013);  
 according to the French law 75% of that 25% goes to the Local Authorities (Code de 
l’Energie); 
 in the Aspe Region there are approximately 11,500 households (INSEE, 2013), of which 
1,200 live in the area were the accident took place. 
Each choice set contained three alternatives, inclusive the status quo alternative, which was 
included in all of the choice sets. Of course, we deleted strictly dominating choice sets. The final 
design contained eight choice sets.  
We labeled each alternative as “electricity supplier x”(with x ranging from 1 to 3), following 
Kataria (2009). This means that, for the sake of the choice experiment, suppliers differed from 
each other for their remedial measures; that is, for the level of the environmental attributes 
attained. As a consequence, respondents faced a choice where they could choose the preferred 
method for producing hydropower.  
3.3 Econometric model 
We used the standard random utility model developed by McFadden (1973) to study 
respondents’ choices. RUM is a standard practice within D E data analysis as its basic 
assumption is that the utility for an individual is composed of an observable component and a 
random component, which gives a utility function of this form:  
Equation 1 
                     
where    represents the observable component,     the random component,    represents a 
vector of attributes used to describe alternative j, and   a vector of parameter coefficients to 
describe preferences for the x attributes.  
DCE analysis normally starts with a conditional logit (CL) model. Under the CL model, the choice 
probability for individual n can be represented as follows: 
Equation 2 
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CL model, though, has some restrictive assumptions. For instance, the model is underpinned by 
the “independence and identical distribution” condition of the error terms. Consequently, it is 
now commonplace to compare CL results with more flexible specifications, for instance the 
random parameters logit (RPL) model. In the RPL model, the parameters vary over decision-
makers in the population with density f(β). Therefore, the unconditional choice probability 
represents the integral of the logit probabilities over all possible values of  βn. As a result, the 
choice probability can be represented by a product of logits.  
Equation 3 
         
          
            
 
   
        
where T is the number of choices observed for each respondent and represents the fact that the 
model is estimated to account for the panel nature of the data. We have decided to model the 
distribution of  the heterogeneity in the non-cost random coefficients with a Normal 
distribution. Finally, both models have been further specified to enable observed factors to enter 
as explanatory variables. The distribution of the parameters in the RPL model is simulated using 
400 Halton draws. 
4 Results  
The choice experiment has been addressed to a representative sample of 200 households in the 
Aspe Region (obtaining a 100% of valid responses).  
Variable Mean 
Age 41.2 
Household component 2.2 
Female 0.6 
Retired/inactive 0.42 
Knowledge of concession 
renewal  
0.16 
Membership in an 
environmental organization 
0.02 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics. 
The mean age of the respondents is 41.2 years and household components are just above 2. 
Almost half of the sample is made of retired or inactive people. All these data are precisely in line 
with the descriptive statistics from the INSEE and confirm that we have a representative sample. 
The respondents were not previously informed of the relevant characteristics of hydropower 
production, in order not to influence their choices. Still, the questionnaire contained concise 
information on why each attribute was chosen and why it mattered for hydropower production. 
The utility function that we have considered is the following: 
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Equation 4 
                                                             
where fish2 is the dummy for satisfactory level of fish population; hydro2 is the dummy for the 
natural level of hydro-morphology; wquality2 and wquality3, instead, are dummies for good and 
very good level of water quality; bill, finally, represents the cost increase with respect to the 
maximum rebate.  For the sake of understanding, in fact, to all level of rebates, we have 
subtracted the maximum level of rebate to create the variable bill: this guarantees that we obtain 
the standard negative sign for the monetary component of a WTP estimation. All betas represent 
the marginal utility of each attribute. Below, we display the results. 
 CL RPL 
Variable Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient 
std. dev. 
Random parameters 
(RPL) 
     
fish2 1.184084*** 0.1735208 2.169009*** 0.39963 1.937563*** 
hydro2 0.4481714*** 0.1979975 0.708363** 0.3579055 1.769222*** 
wqaulity3 0.5389399*** 0.1745646 0.9831765*** 0.31508 1.452827*** 
      
Non random 
parameters (RPL) 
     
bill -0.0063373* 0.0037652 -0.0086729** .0046232  
wquality2 0.542481*** 0.1495472 0.9922118*** 0.1938956  
      
Heterogeneity in mean 
(RPL) 
     
noactivity*fish2 -0.0830789 0.1967004 -0.1867184 0.4669838  
noactivity*hydro2 0.1935158 01746668 0.3188637 0.414731  
noactivity*wqaulity3 0.0981564 0.1562516 0.0766876 0.3459304  
vicinity*fish2 0.0479222 0.2884071 -0.1673958 0.6518002  
vicinity*hydro2 0.4718627* 0.2643574 0.4304723 0.5784721  
vicinity*wqaulity3 0.2031643 0.2271253 0.1295728 0.4971679  
      
Individuals 200  200   
Observations 4.800  4.800   
Replications   400   
Significant *** at 1% 
** at 5% 
* at 10% 
 *** at 1% 
** at 5% 
* at 10% 
  
Table  3: Conditional and Random Parameters Logit for Main Water Bodies. 
All of the attributes are significant and with the expected sign. The comparison between the CL 
and the RPL shows how taking into account heterogeneity permits to better estimate the 
coefficients. Not surprisingly, the most important attribute is fish population: people are willing 
to preserve the wild salmon and the sea trout population. It is important to highlight that doing 
leisure activities in the Aspe valley and living within 1 km from the river do not influence the 
results. 
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The results of the models permit to estimate the marginal willingness to pay. As anticipated 
before, the betas can be seen as the marginal utility of each level of each attribute; therefore, 
observing the choices that individuals make when some attribute level changes and observing 
the price associated with this particular scenario of change, we can derive marginal values for 
each attribute when moving from the opt-out level to each other level of the attribute, according 
to the formula: 
Equation 5 
         
    
  
 
where        is the marginal willingness to pay to move from the opt-out level to level a of 
attribute x;      is the marginal utility of level a of attribute x;    is the marginal utility of money. 
  
Variable  L (€/year) RPL (€/year) 
fish2 186,84 250,09 
hydro2 70,72 81,68 
wqaulity2 85,60 114,40 
wqaulity3 85,04 113,36 
Table  4: Marginal willingness to pay for attributes (90% confidence interval). 
Table 4 shows that households have a significant marginal willingness to pay and that both 
models give similar results. As already anticipated above, MWTP for a satisfactory fish 
population is considerable: between € 187 and € 250 per household per year. Households are 
also willing to pay for natural flow and higher water quality. 
These estimates can be used to calculate the total WTP for different management scenarios. 
Since the utility function that we am using is linear, its value is the sum of its parts, that is, 
attributes can be combined in different ways to estimate welfare effects of discrete changes of 
the set of attributes. This situation can be calculated with the log-sum formula (Hanemann, 
1999):  
Equation 6 
       
 
   
       
 
       
 
  
Where    
  and   
  represent the utility after and before the change and    is the marginal utility 
of money. 
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Scenario CL (€/year)  RPL (€/year) 
 Single 
Household 
Aspe 
households 
Single 
Household 
Aspe 
households 
From status quo to 
satisfactory fish 
population, natural flow 
and very good water 
quality 
111,86 1.286.370 144.08 1.656.967 
From status quo to 
satisfactory fish population 
and natural flow 
74.92 861.635 94.85 1.090.794 
Table  5: Compensating surplus (WTP) for different scenarios. 
As shown in scenario 2, the willingness to pay for a pristine Aspe (that is a satisfactory level of 
fish population, a very good water quality and a natural flow), is estimated between € 112 to € 
144 euro per household per year. Considering that in the Aspe region there are a bit less than 
13.000 households, the cumulated willingness to pay is not far from € 2 million euro. Moreover, 
the WTP is higher than the maximum rebate that hydropower operators could offer, meaning 
that the fluvial ecosystem is something that really matters to the local community.  
Let’s now compare our results with the restoration costs estimated during the accident. 
Restoration costs varied between € 97,000 and € 121,000, according to the area to be recovered.  
It is important to bear in mind that the operations carried out were just to recover a part of the 
Aspe to its previous status, the one that we consider as the status quo in our questionnaire. This 
means that the results are not comparable as they refer to different levels of ecosystem 
improvements. Still, they can give a hint of the differences between the methods. Considering 
that the households living in that same area are a bit less than 1,200, we can show the results, 
taking into account both scenarios. 
€ Restoration CL RPL 
Cost/Value 97,000 - 121,000  89,910 – 134,230 113,882 – 172,901 
 Table  6: Comparing restoration costs with the compensating surplus for different scenarios. 
It is immediate to see that restoration costs underestimate the value of the ecosystem.  The cost 
of restoring the upper part of the Aspe is lower than the perceived value of  improvements from 
the current status to better fluvial ecosystem situations. These results show once again that 
people considerably value the environment they live in.      
5 Final remarks 
In the next years, France will have to renew the Concession of a consistent part of its 
hydropower capacity. Beauty contests will take place, where bidders have to present offers for 
technical and environmental improvement, as well as a revenue sharing percentage for Local 
Authorities.  
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This framework generates a potential trade-off between revenue-sharing and environmental 
improvements. Both potential bidders and Authorities should be interested in estimating the 
value of the fluvial ecosystem and people’s willingness to pay for pristine rivers. This knowledge 
should bring about a better structured beauty contest and more effective bids. 
Consequently, the paper investigates this potential trade-off between a better environment and 
a higher percentage of money handed down to Local Authorities by estimating people’s 
preferences, with a discrete choice experiment. 
The peculiarity of the DCE we have conceived is that we have translated the revenue sharing in 
an immediate rebate in the electricity bill. Respondents could choose higher rebates and lower 
ecosystem improvements or lower (or no) rebate and higher ecosystem amelioration. In real life, 
there will be no rebate; still, an increased amount of money for local communities should mean 
either less local taxes or better local services.  This explain why we targeted only households in 
the Aspe region: a consistent part of the revenue sharing percentage will, in fact, accrue to local 
authorities. 
The paper shows that people are willing to pay to increase the ecological status of the Aspe 
river; the highest total willingness to pay (WTP) is above € 144 per household and per year. 
Results show that people’s MWTP for a specific attribute can reach 250 €/year, that is three the 
maximum rebate that was offered. Moreover, all environmental attributes are considered as 
significant and worth a monetary effort. 
The implication of this study are straightforward: people value considerably the improvement of 
the Aspe ecosystem and they value it more than its actual restoration costs. This means that the 
beauty contest should stress this element throughout the process. Moreover, bidders should 
react accordingly and develop specific strategies for increasing their chances, by offering more 
on environmental improvements.  
Of course, there is scope for further research. The results of the DCE could be largely influenced 
by its design, so it could be useful to replicate the study, not only in the Aspe, but for all other 
rivers where the concession renewal is going to take place.  
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Annex 
 
The English translation of the survey made in the Aspe Region. 
------------ 
Paris X University and Bocconi University (Italy) are working on a research program, whose 
purpose is to provide a tool for assessing the environmental costs of operating hydroelectric 
concessions. The Aspe River is one of the mountain streams that have been selected for this 
research, which entails a survey to study households’ attitude towards hydropower production.  
 
Aspe River 
The Aspe River is listed as one of the "Natura 2000" 
sites. The Natura 2000 network concerns natural 
or semi-natural areas of the European Union of 
great heritage value, because of their exceptional 
flora and fauna. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We remind you that the survey is anonymous.  
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Section 1 
1. You are… 
a. Male 
b. Female 
2. Your year of birth 
a. ……. 
3. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
a. Elementary school  
b. Junior high school  
c. High school  
d. University degree 
e. Other ______________ 
4. How many people live in your family (including yourself)? 
a. ....   
5. Your annual income (in Euro)? 
a. 0-10,000 
b. 10,001-20,000 
c. 20,001-30,000 
d. 30,001-50,000 
e. 50,001-100,000 
f. over100,000 
6. At what distance is the Aspe River from your house? 
a. Less than a kilometre  
b. Between 1 and 5 kilometres 
c. More than 5 kilometres 
7. Do you practice any leisure activity connected to the Aspe? 
a. Fishing 
b. Swimming 
c. Hiking  
d. Rafting 
e. Canoeing 
f. Hunting  
g. Studies and research 
h. Others 
i. No activity    
8. How often you practice those activities: 
a. Weekly 
b. Monthly 
c. More than once per year 
d. At least once a year 
e. Less than once a year 
9. Are you a member of an environmental organization?  
a. Yes 
b. No 
10. Are you aware of the fact that in the next years hydropower concessions in the Aspe 
River will expire?     
a. Yes 
b. No 
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Section 2 
8 scenarios (choice sets) are presented below. They concern the environmental impacts 
generated by different ways of managing hydropower. 
We took into account a limited number of environmental attributes and, similarly, we have 
considered a limited number of levels of variation for each attribute. Although they are not 
exhaustive, attributes and levels chosen give a precise idea of the ecosystem under study. 
In each scenario, we assume that there are three hydropower producers. Each producer offers 
annual rebates on your electricity bill. Producer "C" will always offer you the maximum rebate, 
preserving the current ecosystem status of the Aspe River. On the other hand, producers "A" and 
"B" will offer smaller discounts, but in each scenario, they will also provide improvements to the 
Aspe ecosystem. 
For every choice set, you will be asked to choose the producer you prefer. There are no absurd 
choices. 
    Choice Set 1 
Attributes Producer A Producer B Producer C 
Fish 
Sea trout 
 
Atlantic Salmon 
 
Not satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Not satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Not satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Hydro-morphology 
Natural 
 
Natural 
 
Artificial 
 
    
Physical and chemical 
water quality 
 
Very good Good Sufficient 
    
Rebate in euro (on your 
yearly electricity bill) 
10 40 75 
Choice 
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Choice Set 2 
Attributes Producer A Producer B Producer C 
Fish 
Sea trout 
 
Atlantic Salmon 
 
Not Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Not Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Hydro-morphology 
Natural 
 
Natural 
 
Artificial 
 
    
Physical and chemical 
water quality 
 
Very good Good Sufficient 
    
Rebate in euro (on your 
yearly electricity bill) 
0 10 75 
Choice 
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Choice Set 3 
Attributes Producer A Producer B Producer C 
Fish 
Sea trout 
 
Atlantic Salmon 
 
Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Not Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Not Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Hydro-morphology 
Natural 
 
Natural 
 
Artificial 
 
    
Physical and chemical 
water quality 
 
Sufficient Very good Sufficient 
    
Rebate in euro (on your 
yearly electricity bill) 
0 0 75 
Choice 
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Choice Set 4 
Attributes Producer A Producer B Producer C 
Fish 
Sea trout 
 
Atlantic Salmon 
 
Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Not Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Hydro-morphology 
Artificial 
 
Artificial 
 
Artificial 
 
    
Physical and chemical 
water quality 
 
Very good Sufficient Sufficient 
    
Rebate in euro (on your 
yearly electricity bill) 
0 10 75 
Choice 
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Choice Set 5 
Attributes Producer A Producer B Producer C 
Fish 
Sea trout 
 
Atlantic Salmon 
 
Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Not Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Not Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Hydro-morphology 
Artificial 
 
Natural 
 
Artificial 
 
    
Physical and chemical 
water quality 
 
Very good Good Sufficient 
    
Rebate in euro (on your 
yearly electricity bill) 
40 40 75 
Choice 
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Choice Set 6 
Attributes Producer A Producer B Producer C 
Fish 
Sea trout 
 
Atlantic Salmon 
 
Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Not Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Hydro-morphology 
Natural 
 
Artificial 
 
Artificial 
 
    
Physical and chemical 
water quality 
 
Very good Very good Sufficient 
    
Rebate in euro (on your 
yearly electricity bill) 
0 40 75 
Choice 
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Choice Set 7 
Attributes Producer A Producer B Producer C 
Fish 
Sea trout 
 
Atlantic Salmon 
 
Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Not Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Hydro-morphology 
Natural 
 
Artificial 
 
Artificial 
 
    
Physical and chemical 
water quality 
 
Good Very good Sufficient 
    
Rebate in euro (on your 
yearly electricity bill) 
10 40 75 
Choice 
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Choice Set 8 
Attributes Producer A Producer B Producer C 
Fish 
Sea trout 
 
Atlantic Salmon 
 
Not Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Not Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Not Satisfactory 
Status and evolution 
 
Hydro-morphology 
Artificial
 
Natural 
 
Artificial 
 
    
Physical and chemical 
water quality 
 
Very good Sufficient Sufficient 
    
Rebate in euro (on your 
yearly electricity bill) 
10 40 75 
Choice 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
